# Can We Rely on TikTok? A Critical Examination of Its Trustworthiness
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Chapter 1: The Rise of TikTok
TikTok has emerged as a dominant force in social media, captivating users and prompting scrutiny from other platforms. My affinity for TikTok makes me question whether my trust in it is genuinely warranted.
During the Trump administration's attempts to ban TikTok, I ardently defended the platform, largely based on its assurances regarding data management—specifically, that user data was stored within the U.S. and managed separately from ByteDance's Chinese ownership. My belief was that this arrangement protected our personal data from unauthorized surveillance, particularly from a government that has a history of cyber espionage against the United States and its allies.
However, TikTok's recent changes in its data handling practices have led me to reassess my stance.
Earlier this month, TikTok announced its collaboration with the Biden Administration to migrate all of its data from its own servers to Oracle, a reputable third-party cloud service provider. The premise is straightforward: if TikTok's data is not stored on its servers—regardless of location—then employees in China would have no access.
This sounds promising, but it raises concerns about the accessibility of user data by TikTok's Chinese employees over the years. While there is no concrete evidence of malicious intent, I can’t shake the feeling that someone back at ByteDance's headquarters might still be monitoring data to aid the Chinese government in enhancing cyber capabilities against U.S. interests.
However, it seems unlikely that these efforts would be state-sponsored, as any such revelation would jeopardize TikTok's operations in the U.S. The Chinese government likely has a vested interest in TikTok's success, just as it does with major enterprises like Apple.
Despite this, I no longer feel that TikTok has been completely forthright with its users. Therefore, I welcome the platform's move towards a more transparent data management strategy.
In the meantime, FCC Commissioner Brendan Carter has come forward, asserting that TikTok has violated the policies of both Apple's App Store and Google Play, advocating for its immediate removal. Apple and Google were expected to respond to this claim by late last week, though their stance remains unclear.
Carter argues that TikTok is essentially a tool for the Chinese government to harvest data. While I concur that TikTok needs to clarify its operations, I reject the notion that it serves as an open conduit for sharing our dance videos and trends.
I maintain that TikTok does not store sensitive information comparable to personal emails or corporate communications. While it would be concerning if Beijing were accessing such data, one must remember that TikTok is a public platform. Anyone in China can view your content directly through the app.
Interestingly, Carter's letter was sent on June 28, just after the high-profile testimony from former White House aide Cassidy Hutchinson regarding the January 6th insurrection. While I cannot confirm a direct connection, the timing seems noteworthy.
Moving forward, TikTok must align its practices with the Biden Administration's expectations, which I believe it will do swiftly, ensuring our data remains free from Chinese oversight. This would not only alleviate my concerns but should also satisfy Carter.
We don’t need to eliminate TikTok from our lives—perhaps just moderate our usage—but we must remain vigilant about all platforms that handle our data and employ intricate algorithms to tailor content and advertisements for us. Understanding how these systems work and who has access to our information is now essential. This expectation should apply to every service, whether operating from China or California.
When it comes to TikTok, a prudent approach would be to trust but verify.